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BOOK NOTICE 
Zen and the Art of Jurisprudence 
Matthew K. Roskoski 
JURISMANIA. By Paul F. Campos. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1998. Pp. x, 198. Cloth, $23; paper, $13.95. 
Lawyer bashing is by no means a remarkable phenomenon. It was 
not remarkable when Shakespeare wrote, "[t]he first thing we do, let's 
kill all the lawyers, "1 and it's not remarkable today. Paul Campos,2 
however, has written a particularly readable example, blending vener­
able Western lawyer-bashing and pop psychology with unsystematic 
invocations of Eastern religion. Jurismania is named after Campos's 
theory that the American legal system has a lot in common with a per­
son suffering from an obsessive-compulsive disorder, an addiction to 
law that does neither the patient nor those around him much good. In 
Jurismania, Campos criticizes our insistence on regulating and legal­
izing every aspect of our lives, and our insistence on exclusive ration­
ality. Campos argues, with regular Taoist allusions, that rationality is 
not and cannot be the exclusive solution to the questions law raises, 
and that irrational methods are and should be employed. Campos's 
intended audience is "the general reader whose experience of 
American law has made him or her wonder if there might not be 
something wrong " with it (pp. vii-viii). Should that audience take 
Campos's critique seriously, it will strike close to the heart of law and 
the legal profession. Thus, although they are not the target audience, 
lawyers ought to think about Jurismania because it reflects and ampli­
fies a perspective that may be common to many nonlawyers who en­
counter the legal system. 
Jurismania should be read not as a didactic composition, a treatise 
on the flaws of American law and how to fix them, but rather as a lit­
erary composition of the type described by J.B. White.3 As a literary 
text, Jurismania is not argument-oriented but rather "experiential and 
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, SC. 2, 
in THE COMPETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 540, 571 (Updated 4th ed., David Bevington ed., 
Longman 1997). 
2. Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
3. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN EsSAY IN CULTURAL AND 
LEGAL CRITICISM 42 (1990) (discussing legal analysis from a literary perspective). 
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performative": it seeks to persuade not by representative data but 
rather by sharing narrative experiences with the reader.4 Similarly, as 
a literary exercise, Jurismania is "not reducible to other terms - espe­
cially not to logical outline or analysis - but express[ es its] meaning[] 
through [its] form,"5 thus generally avoiding the type of logical proof 
Campos seeks to critique. As an invitation to discourse, Jurismania is 
well taken. It has a broad, sweeping scope that can provide the start­
ing point for a host of valuable inquiries: Are particular laws exces­
sive, in that they attempt to regulate a sphere of life best left to private 
authority? Do particular cases rationalize excessively, or do they dis­
guise leaps of intuition or preference as rational argument? Do par­
ticular lawyers, or does the profession in general, undervalue sincerity 
and overvalue artifice and feigned emotion? 
Even though Jurismania is, fundamentally, a literary text, it still 
has substantive and legal aspirations. To be fair, Campos nowhere as­
serts that Jurismania is meant to be a self-sufficient critique of 
American law. In many places, he expressly disavows any attempt to 
suggest remedies for the problems he identifies. But these denials and 
disavowals go hand in hand with a treatment that looks and sounds 
thorough, such that a reader might be left with a sense that she has 
heard all she needs to hear. Further, Jurismania often does shade over 
from the narrative to the prescriptive and overtly directs the conclu­
sions a reader is meant to draw. This Notice aims to preempt the 
sense of completeness one might get by reading Jurismania alone and 
to demonstrate that Jurismania is deficient as a free-standing critique 
of the American legal system. 
Part I reviews the central themes of Jurismania. Part II identifies 
some ways in which Jurismania does not tell the complete story. 
Campos allows his perspective to color his thinking, distorting his view 
of the legal system in at least two ways. First, and perhaps most ironi­
cally (given his marked aversion to law-obsessions), since Campos is a 
law professor, he tends naturally to see only the ways in which law 
pervades any problem, missing nonlegal aspects. Second, as a modern 
law professor, Campos misses the extent to which the problems he 
isolates have been with us since antiquity. Part III raises a different 
kind of question about Jurismania, suggesting that when he complains 
about "too much law," Campos condemns legal regimes aimed to­
wards the redress of social and economic inequality. Campos's vision 
of the law as intruding on a presumptively legitimate private sphere 
fails to take into account the ways in which the private sphere upon 
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I. 
If he has done nothing else, Campos has thoroughly escaped from 
the normal mode of legal scholarship that White critiques: "voices, 
audiences, and languages that seem impossibly sterile or empty."6 
Jurismania is an easy and pleasurable read, and it speaks in Campos's 
voice, revealing the breadth of his reading and the variety of ways in 
which he thinks about the American legal system. Jurismania devel­
ops several theses. In fact, the range of Campos's analysis is so broad 
that any effort to summarize it in less than book-length form will nec­
essarily fail. What follows is an attempt merely to review some high­
lights. 
Campos's central thesis is "that, in its more extreme manifesta­
tions, what Americans call the 'rule of law' can come to resemble a 
form of mental illness" (p. ix), specifically addiction. Further, the ill­
ness is self-perpetuating and self-destructive: "[I]t is in the nature of 
obsessions to cause us to pursue something in such an excessive way 
that we not only fail in our quest, but end up pursuing the opposite of 
whatever it was we were pursuing in the first place" (p. vii). In sup­
port of this proposition, Campos adduces a broad range of evidence, 
drawing from strictly legal sources to nonlegal sources emulating legal 
forms. He cites a variety of regulations and codes of conduct, includ­
ing those of the NCAA (pp. 6-8) and the Louisville Public Library (pp. 
129-30). He points to a battery of cases, some sensationalistic, some 
absurd. Included in his collection are the familiar staples: O.J. Simp­
son's trial (pp. 17-18) and Jones v. Clinton.1 But his collection also in­
cludes some cases that are less well-known to the popular media, in­
cluding Sawada v. Endo,8 a Hawaiian marital property case, and Quill 
v. Vacco,9 a Second Circuit physician-assisted suicide case. 
An additional theme in Jurismania is the inauthenticity of lawyers 
and legal thought. As Campos says, "inauthenticity is essential to 
authentic legal thought. Practicing lawyers must often maintain a pe­
culiar mental state in which they fail - authentically - to recognize 
the inauthenticity of their claims" (p. 13). In Campos's vision, lawyers 
displace politicians and used-car salesmen as the paradigm case of 
false sincerity. One cannot help but wonder how Campos feels about 
being a professor at a professional school yet having such utter con-
6. Id. at 10 ("Those of us engaged in writing of this kind find that the worst and most 
painful consequences of the character of our discourse are those we suffer when we our­
selves try to write, when we find that we are captured by voices, audiences, and languages 
that seem impossibly sterile or empty; diluted; defensive; full of static; in a deep sense un­
real."). 
7. P. ix; Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), modified by 72 F.3d 1354 
(8th Cir. 1996), aff d 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
8. Pp. 107-113, 117-18; 57 Haw. 608 (1977). 
9. Pp. 163-68; 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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tempt for the professionals he is creating.10 That qualm aside, how­
ever, Campos's criticism certainly resonates with the popular percep­
tion of lawyers and legal ethics. 
The final core theme running through Campos's work is one he 
shares with his colleague Pierre Schlag: a critique of the legal system's 
reliance on exclusive rationality.11 To illustrate why this claim to per­
fect rationality is mere pretense, Campos develops a three-part "effi­
cient process " theory. The three parts of his theory are: "l) In a legal 
system, efficiently processed disputes will be settled to the extent that 
the available information predicts a likely outcome " (p. 60); "2) The 
further an efficiently processed dispute travels through a dispute proc­
essing system, the more firmly that dispute is lodged in a legal equilib­
rium zone " (p. 61); and, therefore, "3) In an efficient dispute proc­
essing system the terminal decision making structures of the system 
will resolve disputes arationally " (p. 64). In other words, the really 
easy cases settle, the relatively easy cases are decided at trial and not 
appealed, and since the Supreme Court only grants certiorari on the 
extremely difficult cases, the Supreme Court is almost invariably 
making it up as it goes along. Supreme Court cases, according to 
Campos, cannot be resolved by mere rationality; if they could, by 
definition they would not be Supreme Court cases. At some point, the 
Court simply has to make a call. 
Apart from the substantive arguments, the rhetoric of Jurismania 
deserves mention. Two rhetorical threads that run through Jurismania 
are in curious tension. On the one hand, Campos employs a relatively 
standard rhetorical move: to belittle law and rationality, he employs 
religious metaphors, deliberately analogizing law and rationality to 
superstition. For example, he describes lawsuits as "a species of sym­
bolic human sacrifice, performed by our relentlessly bureaucratic 
priesthood " (p. ix), and describes law school as "a seminary for the 
production of a mystifying priestcraft, whose obscurantist incantations 
help legitimate the power of the social and cultural elite " (p. 175). 
This strategy is certainly not unique to Campos - other authors have 
used it to belittle their nemeses of choice.12 Not only is this strategy 
offensive - particularly to genuinely religious people - but it is also 
10. I owe this observation to Professor Don Herzog of the University of Michigan Law 
School. 
11. See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) ; Pierre Schlag, 
Law as a Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427 (1997). 
12 See, e.g., A. ERNEST FITZGERALD, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF WASTE (1972) ; RALPH 
GLASSER, THE NEW HIGH PRIESTHOOD: THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF A MARKETING-ORIENTED SOCIETY (1967) ; RALPH E. LAPP, THE NEW 
PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND THE USES OF POWER (1965) ; MARY MIDGLEY, 
SCIENCE AS SALVATION: A MODERN MYTH AND ITS MEANING (1992) ; MARK C. MILLER, 
THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLmCS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN 
PoLmCAL INSTITUTIONS (1995). 
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in conspicuous tension with the Eastern religious themes Campos 
weaves throughout Jurismania. 
Campos, in the process of criticizing our society's overemphasis on 
rationality and science, employs rhetoric strongly suggestive of some 
diluted variety of Taoism. For example, in Chapter 8 he isolates "two 
things" that we are all "required" by our rationalist and science­
centered culture "to believe" (p. 138). They are: 
1. The universe consists entirely of particles in fields of force. There are 
no such things as spirit or soul or karma or God, except to the extent 
those entities are projections of the human mind. The human mind it­
self is either: (a) an independent emergent property of otherwise 
mindless biological processes, or (b) can be reduced entirely to a 
nonmental account of those same processes. 
2. All matter is a produce of mechanistic material processes, and all life 
is a product of mindless evolutionary processes. Therefore all teleo­
logical (mindful, design-based) accounts concerning the ultimate na­
ture of the world are false.13 
Campos then proceeds to question these propositions, pointing out 
that the decision to accept them instead of a religious explanation is, at 
bottom, a leap of faith. If science grounds at some level on a leap of 
faith, Campos asks, then what's wrong with the religious leap of faith? 
Consistent with this perspective, Campos offers his own "tentative 
contribution" towards the goal of slowly eroding America's jurisma­
nia: 
Law is suffering. 
Suffering arises from the desire to get it right. 
Rid yourself of that desire and rid yourself of suffering. 
To eliminate the desire meditate on these other truths. 
We might call this "the way of renunciation." [p. 192] 
13. P. 139. This may be one of Campos's most aggressive overstatements. One wonders 
how we can be "required" to believe these things when it seems that every year, more and 
more people decline to do so. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Morality, Spirituality, and Democ­
racy, SOCIETY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 37 ("[T]he very trends that critics attempt to correlate with 
diminishing spirituality . . .  have occurred despite constant rates of church going, virtually 
universal belief in God, and somewhat elevated levels of belief in heaven and hell."). Nor is 
it at all clear that modern science and religion are deeply incompatible. See, e.g., D. Boulter, 
Public Perception of Science and Associated General Issues for the Scientist, 50 
PHYTOCHEMISTRY 1, 6 (1999) (distinguishing the province of science - descriptive report­
ing of causal laws and events - from the province of ethics and religion - normative analy­
sis of why particular causes exist and whether events are good or bad); Holmes Rolston III, 
Science, Religion, and the Future, in RELIGION AND SCIENCE: HISTORY, METHOD, 
DIALOGUE 61, 73 (W. Mark Richardson & Wesley J. Wildman eds., 1996) ("Where is God 
in the story? God is the historian, the author who informs the action, slipping information 
into the world, making the improbable probable, converting contingency into destiny. 
Along these lines, the dialogue between biology and theology faces a promising future . . . .  
Such an account of God's agency, made for the biological sciences, is readily consistent with 
an account made for the human culture."). 
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There is manifest tension here. If we have no evidence to conclude 
that the antiteleological interpretations of the world are true, and if 
the teleological explanations are equally as plausible (p. 143), then 
why is religion the paradigm case for foolish and meaningless ritual? 
Even granting, arguendo, that a given religion's teleological worldview 
is correct (i.e., that the divinity the religion venerates exists and is re­
sponsible for the creation), suddenly their rituals no longer seem fool­
ish and meaningless. Campos, in other words, switches faces from 
time to time - sometimes he is the relentless skeptic, analogizing law 
to religion (something we are meant to intuit is absurd), but other 
times he is the persecuted believer, decrying the secular dogma that 
we are "required to believe." 
II. 
While Campos clearly succeeds in speaking in his own voice and 
avoiding the dry and sterile forms of ordinary academic discourse, he 
perhaps goes too far in this endeavor. Robert Pirsig begins Zen and 
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance with a small disclaimer - the book 
"should in no way be associated with that great body of factual infor­
mation relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice. It's not very fac­
tual on motorcycles, either."14 In this Part, I critique the proof and 
perspective of Jurismania, suggesting that it is not very factual on law 
or the contemporary American legal system. Specifically, I suggest 
two structural problems with Campos's analysis. First, Campos's pro­
fessional perspective - as a lawyer and a law professor 1 5  - biases his 
analysis, leading him to see the hand of law at work even when law is 
far from the most sensible explanation. Second, Campos's contempo­
rary perspective - at times blind to history - also influences his 
analysis, such that he sees the world around him as something new, as 
a departure from the "old days" even when it is not. 
A. The Bias of Profession 
If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem will look like 
a nail. Paul Campos is a lawyer and a law professor. One would ex­
pect that central fact to have a profound influence on how he sees the 
world, and Jurismania bears that expectation out. When Campos de­
scribes the extent to which our society is juridically saturated (i.e., 
permeated by law in every direction), it bears asking: How much of 
this "juridical saturation" is noticeable only to law professors who al­
ways see and hear the legal side of every issue? How much, in other 
14. ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974). 
15. Before joining the faculty at the University of Colorado, Campos practiced law with 
Latham & Watkins, Chicago. 
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words, is merely the ironic symptom of Campos's inability to remove 
the law-colored glasses? 
Campos opens with the example of Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf, a 
guard for the Denver Nuggets. Abdul-Rauf refused to stand during 
the national anthem, claiming a religious objection. The New York 
Times called to get Campos's opinion on the matter. Campos draws 
insight from the subjects the reporter wanted to discuss with him: 
I do have some questions I'd like to discuss with the Times reporter, 
questions in which he seems to have no interest. For example, what does 
it tell us that the NBA actually has a formal rule addressing this particu­
lar contingency? How is it that Abdul-Rauf claims to believe his Islamic 
faith prohibits him from saluting the flag when no sect of Islam enforces 
such a prohibition? And is he ever going to get his game back together? 
But the reporter doesn't want to hear about any of that. He wants to 
talk about the First Amendment. [p. 4] 
One wonders what Campos, who is after all a professor of law, ex­
pected. Surely a reporter interested in the religious side of the contro­
versy (whether Islam actually prohibits flag salutes) would consult an 
expert on religion, not a law professor. Likewise, just as a New York 
Times reporter would not consult Billy Packer (a college basketball 
broadcaster) about the implications of Roe v. Wade16 (or any other 
complex case), he or she wouldn't consult Paul Campos about religion 
or sports questions. 
Furthermore, Campos's dialogue with the New York Times re­
porter could be taken as evidence of a lack of juridical saturation. 
One would expect - juridical saturation or not - that the average 
citizen would be aware of the major provisions in the Bill of Rights. 
That is simply a part of our political culture.17 Thus, the reporter's in­
terest in discussing the First Amendment is to be expected. The fact 
that the reporter does not want to discuss the details of the NBA 
agreement, or "what [it tells] us that the NBA actually has a formal 
rule addressing this particular contingency" reveals not the reporter's 
fixation on law but rather the reporter's ignorance of and disinterest in 
the esoterica of law. Campos's interviewer saw the constitutional law 
issues raised by Abdul-Rauf's case, but neither saw nor cared about 
the contracts or property issues. Campos's evidence is at least inde­
terminate: the jurismaniacal glass can be either half-empty or half­
full. 
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
17. See, e.g., 1 ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON, & HERMAN BELZ, THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT xxii ("The constitution thus 
has a configurative effect. This effect is seen further insofar as the Constitution provides the 
institutional forms, procedures, rhetoric, and symbols by which politics is carried on in the 
United States."). Campos doesn't miss this point. See p. 181 ("As parochial as our own pe­
culiar concept of the rule of law may be, we nevertheless know or sense that this concept is 
in many ways identical with the constitutive ideology of our public political culture."). 
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To skip now to the end, Campos reaches a remarkable conclusion 
in Chapter 10. Beginning with the proposition that "[l]awyers are of­
ten impelled by their professional obligations to become something 
akin to emotional prostitutes; that is, to be persons whose public per­
sonae require the simulation of inauthentic affective states" (p. 176) ­
most notably, outrage - Campos asserts that "various dramaturgical 
requirements of the adversary system are now being assimilated 
gradually into all forms of public conversation" (p. 177). The key 
problem, per Campos, is that: 
[T]hose who mimic the professional personae of lawyers are usually un­
aware that lawyers are almost always faking it. So it is that when a 
Boulder citizens' group expresses "outrage" over a zoning variance that 
will allow a McDonald's to be built, its various members really are out­
raged. In this way the gradual juridification of public debate leads to a 
general cheapening of political discourse. Such a generalization of court­
room language and affect to all matters of public controversy causes 
people to use the same terms to condemn a proposed slowing in the rate 
of growth of Medicare outlays as they do to lament the practice of geno­
cide in Bosnia or Rwanda. [pp. 177-78] 
So, as I understand Campos, public rhetoric has escalated lately, and 
the law is to blame. 
Surely that stretches credibility. If in fact public rhetoric has been 
escalating of late, a desire to imitate lawyers is hardly the most likely 
culprit. A desire to capture media attention is more likely: the more 
extreme the rhetoric, the more likely the protest is to appear on the 
nightly news or in the local paper, and to get picked up by the national 
media. Lawyers or no lawyers, sensationalism always has and always 
will sell papers.18 But Campos is not a journalist, Campos is a lawyer, 
so Campos places his emphasis on the role of law. 
B. The Bias ofTime 
Jurismania describes many of the phenomena it identifies in a 
manner that implies that they are somehow new; yet prior generations 
suffered through strikingly similar legal excesses. Virtually every 
complaint Campos identifies shares a similar historical pedigree, a 
pedigree which one might not perceive from the pages of Jurismania. 
While Campos concedes that jurismania "is hardly unique to moder­
nity" (pp. 4-5), he insists that we are experiencing a uniquely high 
dose: "[T]he increasingly bureaucratic structure of modem life has 
allowed [the juridical saturation of reality] to accelerate to a truly 
18. See SUSAN D. MOELLER, COMPASSION FATIGUE: HOW THE MEDIA SELL DISEASE, 
FAMINE, WAR AND DEATH 68-69 (1999) ("Since the news media are part of the entertain­
ment media, they are printed to tell the most compelling stories they can. If they don't, they 
lose their audience to other, more arresting sources or more simply to apathy and compas­
sion fatigue."). 
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striking extent" (p. 5). One wonders how true that really is. Perhaps 
today's legal excesses strike us as particularly bad because they are the 
ones we are suffering through. To take only two examples, Campos 
identifies and complains about overly hyped trials and the invasion of 
procedurally complex law into formerly private, unregulated spheres 
("juridical saturation"). Both have lengthy historical pedigrees. 
Overly hyped trials are nothing new, Campos's emphasis on the 
O.J. Simpson trial (pp. xi, 17-18, 22, 178, 182) notwithstanding. The 
Trial of the Century, Bruno Hauptmann's 1935 trial for kidnapping 
the Lindbergh baby,19 which was the first criminal trial to be viewed 
nationally on film,20 drew hundreds of reporters to Flemington, New 
J ersey21 and sparked a media sensation every bit as extravagant as 
Simpson's:22 
Every unit of the most complete news distributing setup yet devised 
clicked perfectly in Flemington yesterday as the attention of the world 
focused on the countyseat of Hunterdon for the opening session of the 
trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. Radio, telegraph, teletype, tele­
phone and cable facilities were supplimented [sic] by aeroplane and mo­
torcycle service to flash second-by-second developments in the court­
room where the jury was being selected and the scene in the community 
where there was a whirl of activity and excitement but every semblence 
of order.23 
The media attention was so manic that reporters literally climbed on 
counsel tables to get pictures.24 Every detail of the trial was 
extensively covered, with headlines like "Wood Expert Ties Ladder 
Rail to Attic of Hauptmann's Bronx Home";25 "Bruno Put Thru 
Readin', 'Ritin', 'Rithmatic Tests"';26 "Dr. Hudson Infers State Police 
Bungled Taking of Fingerprints";27 and "Hauptmann Sentenced to Die 
19. The trial itself is unreported. For the (unsuccessful) appeal, see State v. Hauptmann, 
180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935). 
20. See Jonathan Turley, Transformative Justice and the Ethos of Nuremberg, 33 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 655, 660 n.27 (2000). 
21. See Jonathan L. Entin, Using Great Cases to Think About the Criminal Justice Sys­
tem, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1141, 1151 (1999) (book review). 
22. Note that my argument here is not that the Hauptmann trial tracked every contour 
of the Simpson trial. It did not, for example, raise questions of race, or jury nullification. It 
did not raise expressly the ability of wealthy defendants to buy superior legal services. My 
point here is merely that it did reflect a public obsession with law and lawyering-and that 
the phenomenon of media fixation on high-profile trials is nothing new. 
23. Alan Painter, Vast News System Clicks Perfectly As Trial Starts, HUNTERDON 
COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 3, 1935, at 1; see also Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Rela­
tionships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 201 (1999) (describing 
the sensationalistic coverage of the Hauptmann trial). 
24. See Laurie L. Levenson, Cases of the Century, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 585, 592 (2000). 
25. Alan Painter, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 24, 1935, at 1. 
26. D.H. Moreau, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 31, 1935, at 2. 
27. HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 1935, at 1. 
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Week of March 18 for Lindbergh Murder."28 Local papers ran weekly 
timelines, with day-by-day summaries in case someone (presumably 
lost at sea or buried in a mountain cave) had somehow managed to 
miss the latest details.29 Hosts of pictures were a daily feature.30 In 
fact, the discovery that the proceedings had been secretly videotaped 
led to the adoption of ABA Canon 35, prohibiting cameras in court.31 
The press covered, as they did to death with O.J., the secondary ef­
fects of the trial: "Hotel Owner Fears the Big Trial Will Ruin 
Flemington,"32 and "Notables Continue to Flock to Flemington for the 
Big Trial."33 The Hauptmann trial even exhibited the same meta-news 
effect that the Simpson trial did, as reporters wrote stories about other 
reporters.34 And, while modern commentators describe the Simpson 
trial as a joke or theatrical, evidently both the Hunterdon Sheriff and 
the Hauptmann jury were actually approached by traveling vaudeville 
companies and offered contracts.35 As the frenzied atmosphere sur­
rounding the Hauptmann trial so aptly demonstrates, it is hard to say 
that the current obsession with the law that Campos describes is worse 
than that of sixty-five years ago. 
Literature also betrays a long history of popular interest in high 
profile trials. Harper Lee's To Kill A Mockingbird36 and Arthur 
Miller's The Crucible37 are but two examples in American literature. 
The obsession is not, however, unique to America. Starting with 
28. HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 14, 1935, at 1. 
29. See, e.g., The Trial In Brief, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 24, 1935, at 5. 
30. See Photographers Have Taken 350 "Shots" in Courtroom, HUNTERDON COUNTY 
DEMOCRAT, Jan. 31, 1935, at 2; see also, e.g., Gloomy Trenton Death House Awaits 
Hauptmann, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 21, 1935, at 14. 
31. See Kelly L. Cripe, Empowering the Audience: Television's Role in the Diminishing 
Respect for the American Judicial System, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 260 (1999) ("The cam­
era's first, surreptitious appearance in the courtroom resulted in its expulsion for sixteen 
years. Following the discovery of a hidden newsreel camera recording the trial of Bruno 
Hauptmann, in 1937 the American Bar Association adopted Canon 35, which prohibited all 
courtroom photography."); David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TY, Conven­
tional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
785, 798 (1993) (linking the Hauptmann trial to the passage of Canon 35). 
32. HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 24, 1935, at 1. 
33. Constance Allen Ward, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 1935, at 1. 
34. See, e.g., Carl W. Ackerman, The Press At The Hauptmann Trial, HUNTERDON 
COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 31, 1935, at 1; All Cameras Barred From the Courtroom Until 
Trial ls Over, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 1935, at l; D.H. Moreau, Gabriel 
Heatter ls One of the Busiest Men Covering Trial, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 
7, 1935, at 1. 
35. See Jury Vaudeville Appearance "Hooey," HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 
21, 1935, at l; Sheriff Not Interested in Vaudeville Offer, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, 
Feb. 21, 1935, at 1; see also Levenson, supra note 24, at 592 (describing the media activity as 
having all the trappings of a circus coming to town). 
36. HARPER LEE, TO KILLA MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
37. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE (1976). 
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Plato's rendition of the trial of Socrates,38 literature is replete with ex­
amples of trial narratives - which often parody actual trials. 
Shakespeare seems virtually obsessed with trials. For example, con­
sider the graveyard scene in Hamlet, in which two clowns debate 
Ophelia's suicide.39 The arguments they make track, and were surely 
meant to parody, the English case of Hales v. Petit.40 Hales raised the 
issue of whether a suicide victim has committed a felony during his 
lifetime (to determine whether the suicide's property reverts to the 
Crown): can the crime be complete before death occurs? Surely this 
is as absurd a legal distinction as is the example on which Campos re­
lies - Quill v. Vacco's41 awkward analysis of physician-assisted suicide 
(p. 166). As another example, recall the trial in The Merchant of 
Venice, in which Shylock proceeds pro se.42 Charles Dickens's Bleak 
House43 traces the (fictional) case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, parodying 
the way lawsuits sometimes have of taking on a life of their own, well 
beyond the issues to which they were originally addressed. Kafka's 
The Trial44 and Camus's The Stranger45 both depicted the legal process 
as incomprehensible and senseless, in a way that presaged many of 
Campos's complaints. Again, Campos's complaints isolate phenom­
ena that are hardly new. 
Further, the invasion of an all-encompassing and procedurally 
complex law is no innovation. Seven centuries before Campos wrote, 
Iceland exhibited the same "juridical saturation" that Campos 
identifies in America. Law in thirteenth-century Iceland provided 
both a solution to problems and a vocabulary for discussing social 
arrangements. "Law played a role in more than the definition and 
processing of disputes . . . .  Norms of good kinship provided the basis 
for imposing legal obligation, which in tum buttressed the norms and 
so on in continual feedback of mutual influence."46 Law governed 
familial and kinship ties, interactions with other kinship groups, 
38. See Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates (2d ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1975). 
39. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act v, SC. 1. 
40. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B. 1562). 
41. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). 
42. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANr OF VENICE, act 4, SC. 1. 
43. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford U. Press 1998) (1853). I owe both this 
and the Hamlet example to A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 819, 823-24 (1990). 
44. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Everyman's Library 
1992) (1925). 
45. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Vintage Books 1989) 
(1942). 
46. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 221 (1990). 
1540 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1529 
production of food, etc. And, just as "American legality" incorporates 
"an obsessive proceduralism that often seems to amount to a belief in 
process for its own sake," (p. 179), so "Icelandic procedure is 
remarkable for its extraordinary complexity and its formalism."47 
Icelandic lawyers were not above deliberately manipulating the 
intricacies of legal procedure.48 Saga lawyers were regularly accused 
of "mere lawyers' quibbles and cheating."49 In other words, "obsessive 
proceduralism" is hardly unique to modern American law; rather, the 
example of Iceland demonstrates that societies were pervaded and 
shaped by complex law hundreds of years ago. 
The fixation on law predates even thirteenth-century Iceland. The 
Roman Empire developed an immense body of judge-made common 
law,50 replete with the same sort of inconsistencies that Campos de­
cries in American law.51 Law was simultaneously an avenue of privi­
lege - "an entry to the governing class . . .  [for] many provincials"52 -
and a scarce resource generally unavailable to the poor or underprivi­
leged.53 Further, Roman law exhibited the same form of sophism, and 
the same obsession with the argument in and of itself, that Campos 
identifies in American law. As Gibbon teaches, the Roman lawyers: 
considered reason as the instrument of dispute; they interpreted the laws 
according to the dictates of private interest . . .  Others, recluse in their 
chambers, maintained the gravity of legal professors, by furnishing a rich 
client with subtleties to confound the plainest truth, and with arguments 
to colour the most unjustifiable pretensions.54 
47. Id. at 248. 
48. See, e.g., NIAL'S SAGA 300 (Magnus Magnusson & Hermann Palsson trans., Penguin 
Books 1960) (describing strategic maneuvers designed to lure a plaintiff into improper selec­
tion of venue). 
49. Id. at 305-07. 
50. See Nicholas Purcell, The Arts of Government, in THE ROMAN WORLD 172 (John 
Boardman et al. eds., 1988). 
51. To demonstrate law's alleged inconsistencies, Campos offers the hypothetical exam­
ple of a school principal confronted with a male student's desire to wear a t-shirt with a sex­
ist message. According to Campos, the principal is confronted with inconsistent legal duties: 
he must respect the student's First Amendment right to freedom of expression, but he must 
also respect the rights of female students not to be sexually harassed. Pp. 35-36. 
52. Purcell, supra note 50, at 171. 
53. See id. at 172 ("[L]egal measures show the same variety, casualness, and lack of gen­
erality which we find in Roman administrative decisions, and indeed it is difficult to separate 
the two . . . .  The result was that the law was not always sufficiently universal, and the under­
privileged might well not reap its benefits."). 
54. EDWARD GIBBON, 1 THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 616-17 
(David Womersley ed., Penguin Books 1994) (1781); see also Kenneth Pennington, The 
Spirit of Legal History, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1997) (book review) ("Just as the 
hunters are not concerned with the birds, [the Roman jurists] were not really interested in 
law, but only in winning the approbation of their fellows (and others) by proffering an in­
genious opinion based on an accepted style of reasoning.") (internal quotations omitted). 
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Roman lawyers exhibited every bit as much "jurismania" then as 
American lawyers do now. Obsessive proceduralism and sophism are 
hardly new or unique to American law. 
To the extent that Campos describes a phenomenon that is not 
unique to our time, but rather has a lengthy historical pedigree, the 
character and contour of the argument changes. Campos should give 
more thought to the history of law and legal excess, because it informs 
the strategy for change. A problem that is relatively recent may be 
easier to uproot. A problem that has been with us since the Roman 
Empire may be more difficult to address. Those who disagree with 
Campos should care about the history as well. Perhaps, even though 
we've successfully weathered at least two millennia- of jurismania, the 
time has come to worry seriously about it and seriously attempt a 
change. But that case would be much harder to make than the case 
against a relatively recent obsession with legalism, and Campos's slim 
volume falls substantially short. Yes, Rome fell, but not at the hands 
of procedurally fixated lawyers. A historical view simply causes one to 
question the significance of the problem Campos identifies. 
III. 
Jurismania's central thesis - that we have "too much law" -
raises issues of power and equality that Campos fails to analyze 
deeply. This Part begins by noting that generic polemics against "too 
much law" are unhelpful. Law is not undifferentiated, nor is it fungi­
ble. Moreover, since law is one of the few institutions in our society 
expressly dedicated to providing the powerless a voice and a tool with 
which to challenge the powerful, analyzing "surplus" law invariably 
raises equality questions. This Part next argues that Campos ap­
proaches his analysis with a flawed assumption: that the private 
sphere without law is entitled to a presumption of neutrality. Often, 
however, the private sphere starts out skewed - heavily biased in fa­
vor of wealth, power, and privilege - such that the incursion of law 
has a leveling influence. Finally, this Part concludes that, beginning 
from his flawed assumptions about the pre-law baseline, Campos often 
selects for derision precisely those elements of the law that are directly 
concerned with remedying inequality. 
A. "Too Much Law" is Meaningless 
Campos analogizes law to water: some is "without doubt a good 
thing," but too much "and we drown" (p. 178). This analogy fails, 
however, because water, unlike law, is fungible such that one need 
only measure quantity to ascertain excess. Law consists not of an un­
differentiated mass but rather of a multiplicity of discrete items: stat-
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utes, regulations, and cases. Judicial decisionmaking is decentralized 
and incremental; it proceeds case-by-case.55 
Further, if one is to do anything other than merely bewail the 
complexity of law, one must select from among the various bits and 
pieces of law. A person troubled by too much water can remove it in­
discriminately - sandbagging or bailing. A community troubled by 
too much law cannot remove it indiscriminately. Starting a law­
reduction campaign by abolishing the homicide law, for example, 
would be absurd. Note that one need not understand Jurismania as a 
polemic against all law to accept this critique. Indeed, Campos is clear 
that he does not intend to advocate anarchy: "[T]he real argument 
isn't about whether law is a good or a bad thing," but rather about 
whether or not we have too much law (p. 178). That question - too 
much law? - is empty, however, without specifics, and Campos has 
no vision of how to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
B. Jurismania's Flawed Assumption 
Jurismania not only fails to identify which laws are surplusage, but 
it also fails to appreciate that any attempt to do so necessarily raises 
fundamental equality issues. Equality is certainly a major concern 
(though, admittedly, not the only coµcern) of the law. While our legal 
system is not immune to capture by wealth and power,56 it is no coinci­
dence that the Constitution chooses the phrase "equal protection of 
the laws."57 The courtroom as a level playing field is deeply embedded 
in our cultural mythology.58 Therefore, before condemning law's ex­
cesses, one should examine the questions of inequality to which law is 
addressed; and before valorizing a regime of informal social sanctions, 
one should ask whether the emphasis on law increases or decreases 
inequalities of power and voice. 
55. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). Hadfield makes this point in the 
context of an economic analysis of the excessive complexity of law, which she argues raises 
the cost of law beyond the means of individuals. The point is equally applicable to Campos's 
thesis, that the esoteric complexity of law makes it both absurd and economically inaccessi­
ble. 
56. For thoughtful and well-documented exposition of this point, see generally id. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
58. Cf Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users 
39 (Oct. 11, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("We like to think of the 
legal system as a site of remedies and protections for the injured and disadvantaged . . . .  We 
cherish court as institutions immune to capture . . . .  "). Whether law can ever achieve this 
goal is largely immaterial, as long as the effort is worthwhile. As Dr. King said, "The law 
may not be able to make a man love me, but it can keep him from lynching me." Martin 
Luther King, Jr., quoted in ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN 
LUTHER KING 41 (1974). 
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Jurismania does not do that. A fundamental problem with 
Jurismania is its assumptions about the baseline - the regime into 
which law intrudes. Campos conceives of law as an undesirable incur­
sion into a presumptively superior private sphere, as his analogies re­
veal: "[I]magine a culture in which doctors thought chemotherapy was 
so wonderful they encouraged people to undergo treatment whether 
they were sick or not, or in which generals routinely sang paeans to 
trench warfare and saturation bombing" (p. 184). Both examples de­
pict law as fundamentally destructive - an evil we sometimes have to 
tolerate to secure its benefits - and both examples treat the status 
quo, before law's incursion, as fundamentally desirable. 
Campos's baseline assumption is clearly visible in his explanation 
of the goals of law.' Campos sees the aim of "final elimination of risk 
itself'' as driving "total juridical saturation" {p. 29). He analogizes this 
objective to living in Boulder, and more particularly to shopping at 
Alfalfa's, an expensive Boulder grocery store where the shopping 
experience is "risk free and 100 percent guaranteed" (p. 29). This 
section of the book is quite revealing - it speaks from privilege, to 
privilege, while mocking privilege; but its vision of law's aim is 
extremely limited. A text by a law professor begins from a point of 
privilege and leaves little room for alternative views. Maybe people 
"buying the $30 per pound smoked salmon they will carry back to the 
communal condominium in new Range Rovers and Saabs" {p. 28) see 
law as a vehicle for the elimination of risk, but others less privileged 
may see law as a vehicle for the redress of inequality. Indeed, this 
view sees inequality as "[t]he Theme that dominates all others" in the 
sphere of law,59 because "equality in our system is inherently and 
necessarily unstable. Without strenuous efforts, it fades over time."60 
Perhaps then the question is not whether we have too much law, but 
rather, "Can legal strategies and techniques be improved and, if so, 
would this make any real difference to the position of those who are 
disadvantaged ?"61 
The section "Welcome to the Working Week" is even more 
illuminating, and the disjunction be�een the experiel,lce Campos 
narrates and the experience of an average blue-collar worker sharply 
exposes the extent to which private power tilts the pre-law playing 
field. Campos finds a "modern panopticon" in the daily routine of an 
office worker: getting up at precisely 6:17, getting dressed, driving to 
work, performing meaningless office tasks, and "emerging from 
59. HAROLD W. HOROWITZ & KENNETH L. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 1 (1969). 
60. RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS: STORIES ABOUT RACE AND 
REsISTANCE 6 (1999). 
61. Bob Hepple & Erica Szyszczak, Preface, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW 
ix (Bob Hepple & Erica Szyszczak, eds. 1992). 
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towers of glass that, at precisely 5:07 every afternoon, disgorge rivers 
of their exquisitely regulated occupants" (pp. 31-34). This narrative is 
meant to illustrate the all-pervasive (and impliedly negative) nature of 
law. 
It's hard to imagine, however, a description that could more thor­
oughly ignore the experience of people not fortunate enough to have a 
white-collar job. For example, while Campos's clothes may be a "deli­
cately calibrated semiotic system" (p. 32), the blue-collar worker's are 
often a uniform demanded by her employer - one that costs her an 
average of $95 per month.62 Occasionally, such uniforms are supple­
mented by "pads worn inside her uniform (which, incidentally, cost 
her almost one-tenth of her weekly wages)" because employers do not 
allow workers "a [bathroom] break for six-hour stretches."63 In the 
absence of government intrusion Guridical saturation), private regula­
tion dominates even the most intimate and embarrassing minutiae of 
people's lives. Campos's hypothetical worker bums his time away de­
veloping the paper trail necessary to fire a useless employee who 
"clings to his sinecure with all the tenacity of a python," relying on 
various elements of the labor law to protect him from dismissal (p. 32). 
His portrait of the entrenched, untouchable employee bears no re­
semblance to the reality of the worker who begins her day with verbal 
sexual harassment, and complains to her personnel manager, who 
"grab[s her] breast and sa[ys], 'Be nice to me and I'll take care of 
you.' "64 While law may be pervasive and obstructive, private power 
(which reigns supreme in the absence of law) is equally, if not more, 
injurious. 
Campos's assumption - that the status quo, without law's inter­
vention, is inherently worthwhile and deserves preservation - thus 
neglects the effects of privilege and the importance of law as a leveling 
force. Privilege, wealth, and power pervade the background against 
which law is superimposed, such that removing law (entirely or in 
part) leaves not a neutral, objectively fair and right condition, but 
rather a tilted condition, biased by wealth and power even more than 
the legal system is. The core objection to Campos's account is that 
Campos sees law's intervention as presumptively unjust, imposing un­
necessary regulation and supervision. That analysis presumes - im-
62. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE 
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 97 (1997) (reporting results of a 
survey of over 400 welfare and low-income single mothers from cities in four states over a 
six-year period). 
63. MARC LINDER & INGRID NYGAARD, VOID WHERE PROHIBITED: REST BREAKS 
AND THE RIGHT TO URINATE ON COMPANY TIME 2 {1998) (detailing the extent to which 
blue-collar workers are routinely required to work for long durations without access to 
restroom facilities). 
64. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 49 
(1979). 
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plicitly or explicitly - that the background against which law regu­
lates is presumptively just. Such a presumption cannot be supported. 
Wealth and power inequalities tilt the pre-law playing field such that 
legal intervention and regulation can no longer be presumed objec­
tionable. 
C. Campos's Neglect of Equality Law 
Just as Campos misses the inequality of the status quo, so too he 
misses the equalizing effects of the laws and legal processes he derides. 
If Campos's examples are to be taken seriously, he seems to have se­
lected as surplus those laws that directly relate to redressing power 
imbalances. Campos criticizes the laws requiring handicapped parking 
spaces (p. 32) ; laws regulating the firing of employees (p. 32) ; and the 
hostile work environment sexual harassment doctrine (pp. 35-36). 
Take, for example, Campos's analysis of what he calls "the sordid 
national spectacle which is the Paula Jones-Bill Clinton litigation."65 
That is, to be fair to Campos, all he says about it in Jurismania. In 
other settings, however, he has described Jones v. Clinton66 as exempli­
fying the problem of jurismania.6 7 The fact that Campos selects a 
sexual harassment case as an example of Jurismania is itself telling,6 8 
but more telling is the absence of an alternative. If the law (or at least 
the legal theory) upon which Jones v. Clinton was based is an example 
of legal excess, then what nonlegal solution does Campos propose? 
Speaking of Abdul-Rauf, he says: "Not so long ago informal social 
pressures would have been exerted on a basketball player to stand for 
the national anthem" (p. 5). If this analysis is meant to be of general 
applicability, it is deficient because it fails to recognize inequality of 
65. P. ix. Perhaps Paula Jones is a poor example, since she received substantial support 
from President Clinton's political enemies. Absent a legal remedy, however, would Ms. 
Jones have received such support? Absent the lawsuit, supporting Paula Jones would have 
been a poor investment for anti-Clintonites. 
66. 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), modified by 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), aff d 
520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
67. See, e.g., Paul F. Campos, Clinton in Crisis, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 
30, 1998, at B7 ("Only in America do we have a legal system that is so thoroughly out of con­
trol and so certain of its own rectitude that incidents such as the surreal proceedings sur­
rounding the Paula Jones affair are not only tolerated, but actually held up as exemplars for 
other cultures. 'Learn from us,' we say to other countries. 'You, too, can enjoy the benefits 
of a dispute processing system that allows platoons of hostile lawyers to harass your nation's 
chief executive with six straight hours of questions regarding the most intimate details of his 
sex life and the precise appearance of his genitals. We call ours "the rule of law." ' "). 
68. This assumes, of course, that Ms. Jones' allegations were true. The author recog­
nizes that this proposition is certainly open to controversy. If they were false, then Jones v. 
Clinton might be an example of legal excess. Notably, Campos seems willing to entertain the 
assumption that the allegations were true. See Campos, supra note 67 ("I am not minimizing 
the significance of either the Jones or Lewinsky affairs. If substantially true, these various 
allegations of sexual impropriety would form an excellent basis for refusing to vote for 
Clinton."). 
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power. One wonders, exactly what "informal social pressures" a 24-
year-old government clerk can bring to bear on the Governor of her 
state.69 Presumably ostracization is not an option given the relative 
power disparity. Shaming, an option Campos has advocated,70 would 
be rather tricky for Ms. Jones to arrange, especially once her target 
was elected President. Law, for all its flaws, at least provides the pow­
erless with a vehicle to challenge the powerful. Mere derision for the 
"sordid spectacle" of Jones v. Clinton is insufficient unless one is ei­
ther willing to leave Jones with no remedy at all, or able to suggest a 
viable alternative. 
Note that, just as I do not impute to Campos the extreme position 
- no law, just social sanctions - so I do not advocate the opposite ex­
treme - no social sanctions, just law. As to any of the phenomena I 
identify as symptoms of a tilted playing field, informal social mecha­
nisms can sometimes play a vital role. In the case of sexual harass­
ment, for example, women can often achieve impressive results by 
confronting their harassers.71 The example of sexual harassment is il­
luminating, because it highlights the relationship between law and so­
cial sanctions. Law can lead as well as follow,72 and one important way 
in which law can lead is through its symbolic or expressive force.73 Be­
fore law recognized sexual harassment as a violation of women's civil 
rights, I suspect it was more difficult to bring social pressures to bear 
against a harasser. The harassee may have felt isolated, may have 
wondered if she was overreacting, and may have had no reason to be­
lieve that anyone else would support her in her objection to the har­
assment. She may not even have known to call it harassment. Once 
the law lends its legitimizing force, however, it establishes the validity 
of the harassee's complaint. Now she has words for what is happening 
to her, and she knows that she is neither alone nor overreacting, be­
cause her society has placed its imprimatur on her complaint. That, in 
69. See Richard Lacayo, Jones v. The President, TIME, May 16, 1994, at 45. 
70. See Paul F. Campos, A Way Out: Hold Public Shaming, LOS ANGELES TlMES, Sept. 
22, 1998, at B7. In his article, Campos seems to envision Congress engaging in the act of 
shaming. That solution does not resolve the power problem, it merely displaces it: How is 
Paula Jones to secure the attention of Congress? She must first capture the attention of the 
public, and doing that is infinitely more possible with a legal claim. 
71. See MARTHA J. LANGELAN, BACK OFF! How TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AND HARASSERS 153-200 (1993). 
72 See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Law and the Quest for Equality, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 
7 ("[L]aw cannot only respond to social change but can initiate it, and . . .  lawyers, through 
their everyday work in the courts, may become social reformers."); Kathryn E. Suarez, 
Comment, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need for Expanded Awareness and Legislation, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 423, 470-71 (1994). 
73. For discussion of law as a symbolic and expressive device, see Sherman Clark, The 
Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381 (1999); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. 
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election­
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993). 
May 2000] Jurismania 1547 
tum, makes it easier to invoke informal social sanctions - to confront 
the harasser personally, to elicit the support of other women in the 
workplace, etc. 
I do not mean to suggest here that Campos is entirely insensitive to 
questions of privilege and power. Far from it - one central theme of 
Campos's critique is that the hypertrophy of American law tilts the le­
gal playing field in favor of the rich. He uses the Simpson trial to show 
that very point (pp. 22-23): 
The grand irony of the American legal system is to be found in precisely 
this: that it is by their very efforts to make law 'fair' - efforts that per­
versely make the benefits of law ever more dependent on the expertise of 
a specialized sector of the upper class - that lawyers in this same sector 
of the upper class have made many of the benefits of law unavailable to 
anyone other than members of the class to which those lawyers belong. 
[p. 25] 
He also recognizes the irony associated with lawyers' purporting con­
cern for the poor : 
This is generally followed by utopian statements to the effect that the 
government 'should' make 'high quality' (a.k.a. expensive) legal services 
available to everyone: statements that to be actualized would necessitate 
the sort of wealth redistribution that would in turn require the elite legal 
establishment to surrender some of its economic and social privilege, 
which of course it isn't going to do. [pp. 18-19] 
Thus, I mean not to suggest that Campos is blind or insensitive to 
questions of privilege, but rather to suggest that before Campos can 
condemn the American legal system as excessive and overly devel­
oped, he must necessarily grapple with the equality questions raised by 
the obvious implication of his critique. 
* * *  
One element of Campos's complaint is surely well-taken - exclu­
sive rationality, as his colleague Pierre Schlag has pointed out, is diffi­
cult if not impossible to sustain. Yet, rationality necessarily pervades 
the law - if Campos urges us to emote our way to legal solutions, he 
owes us an explanation of how we can make such a regime function. 
Campos says that "apologists for American law always claim in its de­
fense that 'the system works' without ever bothering to explain what 
they mean by this" (p. viii). What I, at least, mean, is that the system's 
emphasis on rationality provides a framework for consensus - a basis 
upon which people bitterly opposed can agree to accept a decision. 
Per Brandeis, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable 
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,"7 4 yet issues of con-
74. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent­
ing). 
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troversy cannot be settled on emotive grounds. An opinion that reads, 
"we've thought long and hard about this; we gazed into the sea; we 
communed with forests of Yosemite; and we consulted - at length -
our consciences" is unlikely to persuade. Perhaps Campos is right that 
"we cannot decide efficiently processed legal disputes on the basis of 
'reason.' We merely decide" (p. 185). Judges, however, must per­
suade - they speak with authority, but at bottom that authority rests 
on persuasion, on the willingness of the populace and the coordinale 
branches of government to accept judicial decisions. Rationality is the 
judiciary's tool to effectuate that persuasion and achieve that support. 
Campos's point cannot stand in its strongest form. Although some 
legal disputes cannot be resolved by resort to reason, reason is 
necessary to reach the point where we know which disputes are 
efficiently processed. Further, reasoning can certainly eliminate some 
options, suggest others, and narrow the range of choices from which 
we must select. Elements beyond formal logic surely enter into the 
calculus, but to mock reasoning in toto is to stretch a point too far. 
Solzhenitsyn struck much closer to the truth: "I have spent all my life 
under a communist regime and I will tell you that a society without 
any objective legal scale is a terrible one indeed. But a society with no 
other scale but the legal one is also less than worthy of man."75 
Solzhenitsyn emphasizes the centrality of balance. Perhaps Campos 
concurs, but if so it would be easy to leave Jurismania under a 
misapprehension. 
The problems with Jurismania that this Notice identifies can easily 
be taken to reflect the enormity of the task Campos set himself. 
Jurismania is a small book, under 200 pages. Jurismania is also a fun 
read, full of lively examples and clear, engaging prose. If Campos at­
tempted to include the perspective of nonlawyers, discuss the degree 
to which the phenomena he identifies are new and the degree to which 
they are old, and identify the specific laws he thinks are and are not 
surplusage, Jurismania would become a massive book and profoundly 
tedious to read. Campos is certainly entitled to choose readability. 
Take Jurismania as an open question, an invitation to consider the 
breadth and territory of American law, an inquiry into the merit and 
necessity of aspects of our legal regime. Do not take Jurismania as an 
answer - its foundations are not firm enough to support a prescrip­
tion, but they certainly suffice to suggest an inquiry. 
75. Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart, Commencement Address at Harvard 
University, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, June 8, 1978, at 680. 
